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LABoR LAW-NATIONAL LABoR RELATIONS Aar-PoWER oF NLRB To 
ORDER EMPLOYER To WITHHOLD REcoGNITION FROM Ass1sTED UNION UNTIL 
UNION Is CERTIFIED-The National Labor Relations Board found on com-
plaint of a rival union that Bowman Transportation, Inc. had committed 
an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act as amended,1 by assisting District 50 of the United Mine Workers 
(UMW). The Board thereupon ordered Bowman to cease recognizing Dis-
trict 50 until such time as District 50 had been certified by NLRB as the 
employees' bargaining representative, and to post notices accordingly. Dis-
trict 50 had not complied with the filing requirements of section 9(f, g and 
h) of the act, and consequently under the provisions of those sections 
could not expect to attain certification by the NLRB until compliance. 
The District of Columbia Circuit2 modified the order to provide an alterna-
tive3 to certification as a prerequisite to recognition. On certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court, held, vacated and remanded to the NLRB. 
While the Board improperly required certification of the union on these 
facts, the court of appeals had no power to add an alternative to the 
order since this was in the discretion of NLRB. NLRB v. District 50; 
United Mine Workers of America and Bowman Transportation, Inc., 
355 U.S. 453 (1958). 
Under section IO(c) of the act, the NLRB has the power to order 
remedies for unfair labor practices; the Board's discretion is broad4 but not 
unlimited, and a remedy must be appropriate5 and suited to the particular 
149 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(a)(2), as amended by the Labor-Management 
Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 141, Title I. These two acts will be referred to simply as the 
"act" throughout, and section numbers will be used as they are amended by the later 
act, even when referring to the act prior to the 1947 amendments. Section 8(a)(2) makes 
it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "dominate or interfere witll the formation 
or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support 
to it .... " 
2 (D.C. Cir. 1956) 237 F. (2d) 585, noted in 70 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1306 (1957) and 41 MINN. 
L. R.Ev. 825 (1957). 
s The court of appeals ordered that the union could also be recognized if it were 
freely chosen as the employees' representative after all effects of tlle assistance had been 
eliminated. Principal case at 457. 
4 Principal case at 458, citing NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584 (1941). 
ts Principal case at 458, citing NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., 310 U.S. 318 (1940). 
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situation.6 Until 1947, it was the practice of the Board pursuant to this 
authorization to order an employer who had violated section 8(a)(2) to 
cease and desist and to disestablish completely the unaffiliated union sup-
ported. 7 In the case of a union affiliated with a national or international 
union, however, the Board would merely order the company to cease recog-
nition of the union involved until such time as the Board certified it as the 
bargaining representative under section 9(c).8 The Supreme Court consist-
ently upheld disestablishment, when used, as an appropriate remedy within 
the Board's discretion,9 following a decision10 under the Railway Labor 
Act.11 The Court never required disestablishment, however, and it was gen-
erally understood that resolution of the question whether disestablishment 
or some lesser remedy was appropriate where the record indicated substan-
tial evidence of an 8(a)(2) violation was within NLRB's discretion.12 
In 1947 section IO(c) of the act was amended to require the NLRB to 
treat affiliated and unaffiliated unions in the same manner with respect to 
remedies for S(a)(l) and 8(a)(2) violations.18 In the same year the Board 
recognized that disestablishment was too severe a remedy in some cases 
under section 8(a)(2),14 so in early 1948 the Board formulated a new 
remedy policy under which it reserved disestablishment as a remedy for 
6 Principal case at 458, citing NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953). 
7 In the Matter of Detroit ·Edison Company and -the Utility Workers Union of 
America, CIO, Local 223, 74 N.L.R,B. 267 at 277 (1947). 
8 The NLRB would do this by having charges against affiliated unions brought 
under §8(a)(l) which makes it an unfair labor practice to "interfere with, restrain, or 
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7" among which 
is an employee's right to organize. In the Matter of Carpenter Steel Co. and United 
Steelworkers- of America, CIO, 76 N.L.R.B. 670 at 671 (1948). 
9 NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261 (1938); NLRB 
v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., note 5 supra; NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., note 4 supra; H. J. 
Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941). 
10 Texas and New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship 
Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930). 
1144 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. (1952) §§151-163. 
12 Independent Employees Assn. of the Neptune Meter Co. v. NLRB, (2d Cir. 1946) 
158 F. (2d) 448, cert. den. 333 U.S. 826 (1948); NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., note 4 supra; 
NLRB v. West Kentucky Coal Co., (6th Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 816; NLRB v. Dow Chemical 
Co., (6th Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 455; NLRB v. Moench Tanning Co., (2d Cir. 1941) 121 
F. (2d) 951; Roehling Employees Assn. v. NLRB, (3d Cir. 1941) 120 F. (2d) 289; Wilson &: 
Co. v. NLRB, (10th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 577, cert. den. 329 U.S. 789 (1946). See In the 
Matter of Detroit Edison Company and the Utility Workers Union of America, CIO, 
Local 223, note 7 supra, at 279. The writer has found only two cases prior to 1947 in 
which courts refused to allow a disestablishment remedy of the Board while supporting 
the Board's determination of a §8(a)(2) violation. One of -these cases, NLRB v. Automotive 
Maintenance Machinery Co., (9th Cir. 1942) 116 F. (2d) 350, was reversed per curiam by 
315 U.S. 282 (1942). The other case refused the remedy on the grounds that the union 
involved had had neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard, NLRB v. Sterling 
Electric Motors, Inc., (9th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 63, and 114 F. (2d) 738 (1940), cert. 
dismissed 311 U.S. 722 (1940). 
13 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §160(c) as amended. 
14. In the Matter of Detroit Edison Co. and Utility Workers Union of America, CIO, 
Local 223, note 7 supra. 
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an employer-dominated union (affiliated or unaffiliated), while in the case 
of a union merely assisted by the employer, the Board only ordered the 
employer to cease contact with and recognition of, the union until such 
time as the Board certified the union to be the bargaining representative.15 
Subsequent court cases upheld -the Board's policy16 and reaffirmed the 
Board's discretion to order complete disestablishment.17 In 1954, however, 
a lower court refused to enforce disestablishment, instead ordering non-
recognition until certification, on the grounds that the evidence was not 
substantial that the union involved was dominated, but showed rather 
that it was only assisted.18 Thus a court imposed a limitation on the 
Board's remedy discretion, i.e., that disestablishment is inappropriate for 
unions merely assisted, which until that time had been self-imposed by 
the Board. In the same year another court held the same way in a case 
involving a union not in compliance with section 9(f, g and h), although 
the court paid no attention to the effect of non-compliance.19 
The principal case was decided by the District of Columbia Circuit in 
1956, only four months after a related case was decided in the Fourth 
Circuit.20 Both courts held that it was beyond the discretion of NLRB to 
require certification before re-recognition of an assisted but non-complying 
union, and the Supreme Court affirmed this holding on appeal of the 
principal case. This holding refuses to allow the NLRB to order a remedy 
which in effect is no greater than disestablishment. Consequently it can 
now be argued that the Court has sanctioned a limitation on the Board's 
remedial discretion in the section 8(a)(2) situation.21 While this limitation 
can be supported by the policy of the act to give employees a free choice ' 
15 In the Matter of Carpenter Steel Co. and United Steelworkers of America, CIO, 
note 8 supra. See 9 STAN. L. REv. 351 at 354 (1957); 6 AL.R. (2d) 426 (1949). 
16 Aerovox Corp. v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 640, cert. den. 347 U.S. 968 
(1954); NLRB v. Parker Bros. and Co., (5th Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 278. 
17 NLRB v. Red Arrow Freight Lines, (5th Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 585, cert. den. 340 
U.S. 823 (1950). The court notes at 586 that it "cannot usurp the functions of the Board 
as to the means whereby to purge or prevent unfair labor practices found by the Board 
under substantial evidence to exist." See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., note 6 supra. 
18 NLRB v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, (5th Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 622, rehearing 
220 F. (2d) 362 (1955). This is the earliest case found by the writer subsequent to 1946 
in which a court refuses to enforce a disestablishment order while nevertheless upholding 
the Board's finding that §8(a)(2) had been violated. NLRB v. Jack Smith Beverages, (6th 
Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 100, cert. den. 345 U.S. 995 (1953), reduces a disestablishment order 
from three plants to one, but on grounds that §8(a)(2) had not been violated at the other 
two plants. Another 1953 case refused a non-recognition order while finding substantial 
evidence of a §8(a)(2) violation, arguing that in the situation voiding an employer-union 
contract was too harsh, NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., (2d Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 719, affirmed 
by 347 U.S. 17 (1953) which, however, discusses another point not in issue here. 
19 NLRB v. Wemyss, (9th Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 465. 
20 District 50, UMW v. NLRB, (4th Cir. 1956) 234 F. (2d) 565, noted by the court of 
appeals decision in the principal case. 
21 There is language in the opinion of the principal case which can be used to 
support this proposition. Principal case at 460, 461. 
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of bargaining representative,22 disestablishment always restricts the choice 
of employees to a certain extent, and has been upheld by the courts as 
a means to greater freedom of choice in the long run. The question is not 
whether the NLRB is to be prevented from ordering remedies that restrict 
employees' choice of representative, but whether to leave the decision of 
applying disestablishment or some lesser remedy to the Board's discretion. 
I£ this question is not left to the Board, then the courts would seem to 
take upon themselves the task of distinguishing between dominated or 
merely assisted unions, a task handled solely by NLRB administrative 
expertise prior to 1954. Although this judicial inroad into an area hereto-
fore reserved to NLRB23 may be influenced by the Administrative Proce-
dure Act of 194624 and Congress's amendment of section IO(c) of the 
Labor Relations Act in 1947,25 it would seem that NLRB is more suited for 
the determination of this type of question which turns on facts and 
experience26 and skirts close to the realm of administrative policy.27 
In the principal case arguments for NLRB discretion over remedies 
yielded to competing considerations concerning the legislative intent of 
section 9(f, g and h).28 Under these sections, added in 1947, unions that 
do not comply with certain filing and reporting requirements are not 
eligible for certification under section 9, or for redress from unfair labor 
22 Section 7 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 141, Title I, 29 
U.S.C. (1952) §157, amending the National Labor Relations Act, 1935, 49 Stat. 452. See 
70 HARV. L. REv. 1306 at 1308 (1957). 
23 See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLR:B, 313 U.S. 177 (1941), especially at 194 where 
the Court states that Congress intended to leave remedies to the "empiric process of 
administration." See also note 12 supra. 
24 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1001 et seq. See especially §lO(e) which 
requires a review of the record as a whole when determining the· existence of substantial 
evidence of an agency finding. In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), 
Justice Frankfurter indicates for the Court the influence of this act on revie1\' of NLRB 
decisions. 
25 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §160(c) as amended. 
26 See COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS 348, 377, 379 (1951), and 
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, note 23 supra. The principal case partly recognizes this 
proposition by remanding to NLRB instead of modifying the order as did the court of 
appeals. This was the procedure followed in the Fourth Circuit decision of District 50, 
UMW v. NLRB, note 20 supra, and was also suggested by two law review notes on the 
principal case at the court of appeals level. See 70 HARV. L. REv. 1306 at 1309 (1957), 41 
MINN. L. REv. 825 at 830, note 20 (1957). Courts of appeals have modified orders in cases 
cited in note 18 supra. 
27 The 1947 shift in NLRB remedies for §8(a)(2) violations indicates the policy nature 
of this type of ruling. The NLRB based its shift in remedies partly on the fact that 
"This is 1947, not 1935; in the interim employees have learned much about protecting 
their own rights and making their own choices with the full facts' ,before them." In the 
Matter of Detroit Edison Company and the Utility Workers Union of America, CIO, 
Local 223, note 7 supra, at 279. See also Williams Motor Co. v. NLRB, (8th Cir. 1942) 
128 F. (2d) 960 at 965, where the court classified NLRB remedies as a matter of "fact" 
related to "policy," which courts must accept unless "unsupported ,by evidence." 
28 Labor-Management ,Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §159(£, g, h). 
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practices by complaint under section IO. The Court has held that non-
compliance with section 9(f, g and h) operates only to deny the union the 
privileges enumerated in these sections, and not to prevent the union from 
claiming other benefits from the act.29 In the principal case the certifica-
tion requirement would operate to disestablish an assisted union or coerce 
it and its parent to comply with section 9(f, g and h). Since the Court felt 
non-complying unions should be treated as complying unions except as 
the act specifies otherwise, it held the remedy as applied here to be outside 
the discretion of the Board. In so holding the Court stressed that its 
principal objection was the "inappropriateness" or "infl.exibility"30 of the 
Board's remedy in a situation where other remedies can be framed to effect 
the purposes of the act. In a sense it might be said that the Court's objec-
tion was not to an abuse of discretion but to a lack of exercise of discretion. 
In this respect, limited to the non-complying assisted union circumstance, 
the decision is a valuable reminder to the Board that it cannot "pigeonhole" 
its remedies, applying them without consideration of the particular facts. 
On the other hand, if the broader generalization of the Court's holding, 
supported by some of the language in the opinion,31 is taken to restrict 
generally the Board's discretion over remedies in the section 8(a)(2) situa-
tion as discussed above, the courts face the greater difficulties of remote 
and inexpert second-guessing of administrative decisions in the complex 
labor field.S2 
John H. Jackson 
29 NLRB v. Dant, 344 U.S. 375 (1953), United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring 
Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956). In the former case, the Court analyzed the legislative history 
of the act and concluded that it was so uncertain that the plain meaning of the words 
(as construed by the Court) would be considered congressional intent. In so holding, 
the Court followed the interpretation of the NLRB. 
so Principal case at 463. 
s1 See note 21 supra. 
32 See COOPER, A.DllUNISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS 379 (1951). 
